Introduction
The philosophy of science has much to contribute to the formulation of public policy.
Contemporary policy making draws heavily on scientific information, whether it be about the safety and effectiveness of medical treatments, the pros and cons of different economic policies, the severity of environmental problems, or the best strategies for alleviating inequality and other social problems. When science becomes relevant to public policy, however, it often becomes highly politicized, and figures on opposing sides of the political spectrum draw on opposing bodies of scientific information to support their preferred conclusions. 1 One has only to look at contemporary debates over climate change, vaccines, and genetically modified foods to see how these debates over science can complicate policy making. 2 When science becomes embroiled in policy debates, questions arise about who to trust and how to evaluate the quality of the available scientific evidence. For example, historians have identified a number of cases where special interest groups sought to influence policy by amplifying highly questionable scientific claims about public-health and environmental issues like tobacco smoking, climate change, and industrial pollution. 3 Determining how best to respond to these efforts is a very important question that cuts across multiple disciplines. One does not want to be too quick to stifle dissenting views, because dissent can sometimes play a valuable role in correcting misconceptions and promoting scientific progress. 4 Nevertheless, there are clearly cases where special-interest groups have hampered good policy making by manipulating science in unacceptable ways. 5 Moreover, even when no one is deliberately attempting to manipulate or misrepresent research, the inherent uncertainty involved in most environmental research can make it very difficult to decide how to handle disagreements between different scientists and policy makers.
Philosophers of science have recently performed a good deal of work that can help promote better policy making in the face of these challenges. In fact, the philosophy of science has recently seen a proliferation of scholarly societies, books, journal articles, and special issues dedicated to public policy and more general questions about how the field can be socially engaged. 6 This chapter focuses specifically on issues related to environmental research and policy as an illustration of three ways in which the philosophy of science can benefit policy making. First, it can help clarify the roles that values play in policy-relevant science. Second, it can help guide decision makers in evaluating and addressing scientific dissent, especially in response to controversial policy issues. Third, it can help guide thoughtful policy responses to scientific uncertainty.
Science and Values
One of the important ways in which the philosophy of science can contribute to better policy making is by clarifying the roles that values play in policy-relevant scientific research. It has been common in policy contexts to draw a relatively sharp distinction between facts and values, with the idea that science supplies policy makers with relatively straightforward facts, and the preferences of the public or their government representatives supply values. An example of this distinction in the context of environmental research is the distinction employed by the U.S. government between risk assessment and risk management. 7 Traditionally, risk assessment has been regarded as a fairly straightforward scientific process of determining the probability that particular hazards will cause specific health effects at the levels to which people are exposed. In contrast, risk management has been regarded as a value-laden process of deciding whether or not those health effects are tolerable and what to do about them, given the range of social costs and benefits associated with them. 8 This effort to keep policy-relevant science free of values has turned out to be more difficult than it initially appears. One can begin to appreciate the difficulties by looking at the process of risk assessment for toxic chemicals. It turns out that in order to produce a risk assessment, scientists have to make a host of judgments that are not settled by the available evidence. 9 For example, they typically test toxic chemicals on animals like rats, and they have to make choices about how to extrapolate from the effects on the rats to the effects that are likely to occur in humans. They also typically test the chemicals at relatively high doses, which means they have to estimate how the effects will change at lower doses. They also have to estimate how the effects will vary on pregnant women or children or other particularly sensitive individuals. In addition, risk assessors often encounter some studies that appear to show that a chemical is toxic at particular dose levels and others that appear to show that it is not toxic at those levels. In these cases, they have to make additional judgments about which studies to trust. All these judgments are "value-laden," in the sense that they are not settled by the available evidence but can have a major impact on the outcome of a risk assessment. Thus, even if scientists do not intend to support some social values over others when they make these judgments, they are ultimately forced to do so. 10 The philosophy of science can make a valuable contribution to public policy by clarifying the range of "decision points" where value-laden judgments arise in policy-relevant science. I have previously argued that there are at least five decision points that are important to consider:
( and (5) choices about how to describe and frame scientific findings.
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Philosophers have highlighted a number of ways in which environmental research is
affected by values at these decision points. For example, in accordance with the second decision point mentioned above, Hugh Lacey has pointed out that risk assessments of emerging technologies tend to focus on examining some questions about their effects (e.g., potential
human health effects or environmental effects) while ignoring other questions (e.g., their social or economic effects). 12 As a result, the risk-assessment process can look very objective while still being significantly value-laden. In accordance with the fourth decision point, a number of philosophers have emphasized that judges and regulators are forced to make ethically significant choices about how much evidence and what kinds of evidence to demand before concluding that potential environmental threats are likely to occur. 13 In accordance with the fifth decision point, I
have argued that even the terms and categories used for describing environmental issues can affect public perceptions of them in ways that are socially significant. 14 Debates about terminology have occurred in a wide range of environmental contexts, including climate change, invasive species, endocrine disruption, genetic modification, climate geoengineering, and many others. 15 Once these sorts of value judgments have been clarified, it becomes possible to scrutinize and critique them. In some cases, it might be desirable for scientists to try to avoid making the value judgments so that they could be handled by policy makers instead. 16 In other cases, it might be sufficient for the scientists to clarify the value judgments that they made so that others could consider whether or not they agree with them. 17 In still other cases, scientists might be able to collaborate with policy makers and other stakeholders to decide how to make important judgments. 18 However one chooses to respond to these value judgments, the goal is to develop a better understanding of how they influence the science that informs policy decisions.
Scientific Dissent
A second way in which the philosophy of science can contribute to policy making is by helping to navigate scientific dissent. A pervasive feature of policy-relevant science, especially environmental science, is the presence of disagreement. In some cases, such as climate-change denial, it is fairly clear that one side of the debate is inappropriately raising bogus objections or misrepresenting the available evidence. 19 In many cases, however, there are legitimate questions about how to interpret the available scientific evidence. For example, the scientific community has been debating the human health effects of bisphenol A (BPA) for more than a decade. 20 BPA is used in a wide variety of products, including can liners and cash-register receipts, but it appears to act as an endocrine disruptor, which means that it can potentially cause health problems by interfering with the endocrine system. While many academic studies have suggested that BPA has the potential to harm human health at the levels to which people are currently exposed, important studies of BPA performed by the chemical industry have not indicated that it is harmful. 21 As a result, major regulatory agencies in the United States and the European Union have been slow to regulate it.
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In response to these sorts of cases, it might be tempting to try to squelch scientific dissent and strive for consensus. Nevertheless, philosophers of science have pointed out that there are significant dangers to doing so. 23 As we have seen, policy-relevant science is invariably value-laden, and it is often difficult to distinguish value judgments that are reasonable from those that are problematic. In response to this difficulty, a number of philosophers have argued that scientific objectivity is most likely to be secured by fostering critical interaction between people with varying perspectives so that they can uncover implicit value judgments and subject them to adequate scrutiny. 24 On this account, dissent is central to maintaining scientific objectivity.
Moreover, Inma de Melo-Martin and Kristen Intemann have emphasized that dissent can promote scientific progress by ensuring that a wide range of research projects, explanations, and assumptions all receive adequate attention. 25 They note that dissent can also strengthen consensus views by ensuring that they have been thoroughly examined, and this in turn can strengthen public trust in science.
Given that dissent can be problematic in some circumstances but beneficial in other Instead of depending on a set of criteria, de Melo-Martin and Intemann recommend shifting attention away from dissent and focusing instead on fostering scientific institutions that engender public trust. 29 They argue that when the public has trust in scientific institutions, special-interest groups will find it much more difficult to wield dissent as an excuse for resisting well-supported scientific conclusions. By alleviating the problematic consequences of dissent, they suggest that it becomes less important to try to draw sharp distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate forms of dissent. De Melo-Martin and Intemann suggest a variety of strategies for promoting greater trust, including the development of better approaches for addressing conflicts of interest and preventing scientific misconduct. 30 Another strategy for productively addressing scientific dissent is to formulate public policies in strategic ways that do not depend too heavily on detailed scientific information.
Science policy scholars have pointed out that in polarized political contexts, those on opposite sides of political debates are likely to wield science as a strategic tool for strengthening their positions. 31 As a result, it is very difficult to resolve political disputes using science; when science is brought into these disputes, it is likely to become sucked into the political debates.
Therefore, it is often most productive to develop creative regulatory and policy strategies that can alleviate political debates without depending too heavily on detailed scientific information.
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Responding to Uncertainty
A third way in which the philosophy of science, and the field of philosophy more broadly, can contribute to thoughtful policy making is by providing guidance for responding to scientific uncertainty. Environmental policy making in particular is plagued by uncertainty, and philosophers have made important contributions to thinking about how to respond to this problem. Three concepts in particular have played an important role in recent philosophical work on this issue: inductive risk, the precautionary principle, and argumentative analysis.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the important value judgments that scientists and policy makers need to make when addressing uncertainty in policy-relevant research is to decide what standards of evidence to demand before drawing conclusions. 33 This value judgment arises because scientists always face inductive risk, which is the possibility that their inferences will end up being incorrect. 34 Philosophers of science have recently spilled a great deal of ink reflecting on how scientists and policy makers can respond to inductive risk in a responsible fashion. 35 Some have argued that scientists should strive to hedge their conclusions so carefully that their claims become relatively certain and free of inductive risk. 36 Others have argued that this effort to avoid uncertainty is unrealistic, and scientists should instead weigh the costs and benefits of drawing false-positive or false-negative errors when setting standards of evidence. 37 For example, if the costs of drawing a false-positive error were particularly low and the costs of drawing a false-negative error were especially high in a particular context, it might make sense for scientists to lower their standards of evidence so that they would be less likely to make a false-negative error.
Deciding how to perform this weighing process in a responsible manner raises a number of additional questions. Some have argued that scientists should, if at all possible, merely express the probability that particular conclusions are true and then let policy makers decide whether or not to accept those conclusions. 38 Others have argued that scientists should choose a fixed standard of evidence so that the public is less likely to become confused about the amount of confidence that scientists have in their conclusions. 39 Still others argue that scientists can adjust their standards of evidence in different contexts, depending on the social consequences of making particular sorts of mistakes, as long as they are sufficiently transparent about the standards of evidence that they are choosing. 40 Another approach is to promote as much engagement as possible between scientists, policy makers, and other stakeholders so that they can decide how to respond to inductive risk in a collaborative fashion. 41 Another way in which philosophers have assisted in addressing uncertainty in policyrelevant science-and specifically uncertainty about environmental threats-is by clarifying the concept of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle calls on decision makers to address uncertainty by taking precautionary measures to address serious or irreversible threats even when the scientific information about those threats is limited. 42 The precautionary principle has been the subject of intense debate, with some commentators arguing that it is a matter of common sense and others arguing that it is a paralyzing principle that is impossible to follow. 43 Philosophers have clarified that at least some of this confusion can be traced to ambiguity about at least three aspects of the principle: (1) the types of threats that should trigger the principle; (2) the amount of scientific information required in order to justify taking precautionary measures;
and (3) the types of precautionary actions that should be taken. 44 Critics of the principle tend to interpret it so that it requires dramatic steps to prevent potential threats, even if there is very little evidence that they will occur, while proponents of the principle tend to interpret it in much more reasonable ways.
The precautionary principle is also sometimes used in an even broader range of ways, referring to practices like setting goals for reducing the use of hazardous substances, shifting the burden of proof onto polluters to show that their activities are safe, carefully examining alternatives to potentially hazardous activities, and incorporating public participation in assessing and managing risks. 45 Clarifying these different interpretations of the precautionary principle does not resolve all disputes about it; there are still important ethical disagreements about whether particular interpretations of it provide good guidance for handling uncertainty.
Nevertheless, conceptual clarification can at least help prevent people from talking past each other and instead promote fruitful discussion of these ethical disagreements. Argumentative analysis has much to offer environmental policy making, where uncertainty is ubiquitous. Consider climate geoengineering, which consists of the deliberate manipulation of earth systems, especially in response to climate change. 49 Some scientists have suggested that we could cool the planet using techniques like shooting sulfur aerosols into the atmosphere or stimulating the growth of ocean plankton in order to absorb carbon dioxide. 50 In the face of massive uncertainty about the consequences of choosing whether or not to employ these techniques, formal methods for decision analysis face significant challenges. Faced with these difficulties, philosophers have explored the strengths and weaknesses of different ways of framing decisions about geoengineering, such as by regarding it as a form of insurance or as a technical fix. 51 They have also explored ethical questions, such as whether it would be problematic to alter nature in such a significant way, or whether geoengineering poses a "moral hazard," or whether it can be justified as the "lesser of two evils." 52 Finally, they have investigated procedural questions about what form of public consent, if any, would be needed in order to justify engaging in climate geoengineering. 53 Cases like this one illustrate that argumentative analysis need not be limited to philosophers of science. Ethicists, political philosophers, and decision theorists also have much to contribute, but the philosophy of science has an important role to play alongside these other specialties.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored three ways in which the philosophy of science can contribute to better policy making, especially with respect to environmental issues. First, the philosophy of science can help to clarify the roles that values play in policy-relevant science. Second, it can help guide policy makers in evaluating and responding to dissenting scientific views. Third, it can help guide decision making in response to scientific uncertainty.
Of course, philosophers of science who want to contribute to public policy still have a great deal of work to do. Even though scholars now have a more sophisticated understanding of the roles that values play in policy-relevant science, there is still a great deal of confusion about the conditions under which particular influences of values are appropriate and the best ways to achieve transparency about those value influences. Similar confusion surrounds the conditions under which scientific dissent is appropriate and the best ways of responding to dissent. And even though philosophers have helped to clarify a number of issues involved in formulating policy under scientific uncertainty, it remains an extremely difficult topic that merits much more work.
As philosophers continue to address these questions, they also need to reflect on the best ways to make their work useful and available to the policy community. This may require collaborating on research projects with scholars from outside philosophy, publishing in a range of journals and other venues that engage more diverse audiences, and altering professional incentives so that philosophers are rewarded for performing these activities. By being creative both about the nature of their work and how they share it with broader communities, philosophers of science will hopefully achieve their goal of performing effective, socially engaged scholarship.
